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Jeff Speaks’s The Greatest Possible Being
BRIAN LEFTOW
Jeff Speaks’s The Greatest Possible Being criticizes several sorts of perfect being 
theology. I show that his main discussions target what are really idealizations 
of actual perfect-being projects. I then focus on whether Speaks’s idealizations 
match up with the real historical article. I argue that, in one key respect, they 
do not and that it would be uncharitable to think that one of them does. If 
the idealizations do not represent what perfect being thinkers have actually 
been doing, a question arises about how much Speaks’s critique should worry 
those pursuing projects modelled on real historical perfect being theology.
If there is a God, we’d all like to know what He’s really like. If there isn’t, 
a lot of us would still like to know what God would be like. Revelation 
gets us only so far, and many don’t trust it, or aren’t sure which purported 
revelation to trust. Thus philosophers rush in where angels fear to tread. 
Since Plato, one of their chief methods—perhaps the chief method—has 
been perfect being theology (PBT). This begins from a claim that God is 
or would be perfect. It then reasons about what a perfect being would be 
like, in hope that this will tell us what God is or would be like. PBT has 
long faced critics, of many sorts and on many fronts. Jeff Speaks’s The 
Greatest Possible Being (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2018) is the most 
thorough and extended broadside against it in the history of philosophy. 
It is first-rate work, careful and rigorous. As one of Speaks’s more fre-
quent targets, let me also say that he is a model of fairness and courtesy 
to those he criticizes. Speaks does not delve much into PBT’s history, but 
whether your interest is in a historical perfect being thinker, or in theo-
logical method, or in the philosophy of religion, the book will repay your 
attention. In what follows, I first outline Speaks’s overall argument, then 
raise some questions.
Types of PBT
Perfect being theologies are machines to crank out divine attributes. As 
Speaks sees it, each has two moving parts. One is a claim that God is the 
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greatest being in some range—actual, possible, or conceivable beings. 
“Pure” PBT adds a greatness condition. “Impure” adds a bridge principle.
Attributes that meet a greatness condition add to a thing’s greatness. 
(Speaks does not worry about what greatness is. He in effect spots PBT 
what it needs to get going, and argues that even so, it doesn’t work.) 
Meeting the condition is supposed to entail being a property of the great-
est actual, possible, etc. being.1 To see how, consider a simple greatness 
condition,
GC: (w)(x)(y)((Φxw ∧¬Φyw*) → (xw > yw*)).
An attribute F satisfies (GC) just in case any F-thing in any possible world 
is greater in any world in which it is F than any non-F thing is in any 
possible world in which it is not F. As Speaks parses being the greatest 
possible, nothing in any world is greater than the greatest possible being 
actually is.2 But then suppose that F satisfies (GC) and the greatest possi-
ble being is not F. Then per (GC), some F in some world is greater than the 
greatest possible being actually is. So, the greatest possible is not after all 
the greatest possible. But it is. So, it is F. The echo of Proslogion 2 (hereafter 
P2) is intentional.
Bridge principles assert that any greatest (actual, possible, conceivable) 
being has every “great-making” property.3 If it seems a live option that 
not all “great-makers” be compatible, one might prefer a bridge princi-
ple asserting that a greatest being has the greatest consistent set of these. 
Impure PBT projects differ over just what the great-makers turn out to 
be.4 Satisfying some greatness condition entails satisfying some bridge 
principle. For one can take a bridge principle’s great-makers to be just the 
attributes that satisfy, say, (GC). Equally, satisfying some bridge principle 
entails satisfying some greatness condition. For one can set up a greatness 
condition that only a bridge principle’s great-makers can satisfy. So, the 
pure/impure distinction does not go very deep in at least one sense: for 
any set of attributes premises of one type produce, premises of the other 
type do or would produce it too. But still, Speaks thinks that, in principle, 
there are six types of perfect being project: pure and impure versions of 
greatest actual, possible, and conceivable being theology.
Speaks’s Overall Argument
Speaks’s critique of PBT’s various possible versions is detailed and intri-
cate—too much so to reproduce here. In broad outline, though, his case 
is as follows. Greatest possible being theology cannot yield genuinely 
1Speaks, The Greatest Possible Being, 11.
2Speaks, The Greatest Possible Being, 16. Thus Speaks’s parsing supposes that God is actual. 
Those unwilling to speak so will prefer a biconditional—that something is God if and only if 
P. Pages 16–17 acknowledge this, and chapter 6 formulates such principles.
3Speaks, The Greatest Possible Being, 73. Speaks’s term for these is “G-properties” (73–74).
4Speaks, The Greatest Possible Being, 74.
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new information about God. Its arguments must do something like beg-
ging the question (chapter 3). Greatest conceivable being theology (chap-
ter 4) cannot find a sense of “conceivable” that is fit for its purpose; and 
it also faces a dilemma. Either there are or there are not conceivable but 
impossible worlds. If there are not, greatest-conceivable projects are just 
greatest-possible projects under another name. If there are, this generates 
“troublemakers,” better-making attributes God conceivably has but can-
not have. The trouble these make is that if God does not have them, God is 
not after all the greatest conceivable being. For we can conceive that God 
has them. If He did, He’d be better. Thus, if He does not, we can conceive 
of something greater than God actually is.5 He is not “that than which no 
greater can be thought.”
Looming beyond all this is a more general worry, the problem of hid-
den attributes (chapter 5). Consider, for instance, a pure perfect being pro-
ject built on (GC). An attribute satisfies (GC) only if whatever has it in any 
world is greater in that world than anything in any world that has any 
attribute incompatible with it. Now, perhaps we can establish this for all 
incompatible attributes we know about. But there might be ones we don’t 
know about. For all we know, some of these are better to have. This (says 
Speaks) should lower our confidence that the attribute really does satisfy 
(GC)—perhaps down to suspending judgment on that. If we suspend, 
though, we can’t use (GC) to warrant belief that God has the attribute. 
PBT has run aground.
Chapter 6 argues inter alia that “greatest possible being” can’t be the 
core of our concept of God. For all we know, Speaks reasons, logical space 
might be inhospitable to traditional Abrahamic theism. Perhaps it allows 
so little greatness that Marcus Aurelius was the greatest being that really 
is possible.6 If we learned that actually, Marcus Aurelius was the greatest 
possible being, we would not conclude that he was God. We would con-
clude instead that there never was a God. So, our concept of God isn’t just, 
or isn’t at its core, the concept of a greatest possible being. For if it were, 
we would conclude that Aurelius had been God.
I don’t think this argument succeeds. For we could wind up saying that 
there had been no God even if being the greatest possible being were at the 
core of our concept of God. Perhaps our concept of God has two core com-
ponents, being the greatest possible being and being “great enough,” or 
5Speaks’s parsing of “greatest conceivable” also treats God as actual. Again, Speaks later 
offers a way around this.
6For earlier versions of this point, see Peter Millican, “The One Fatal Flaw in Anselm’s 
Argument,” and Graham Oppy, “Perfection, Near-Perfection, Maximality, and Anselmian 
Theism.”
7On the other hand, things could well be this way: our concept of God just is the concept 
of a greatest possible being. For us, to be God is to be the greatest possible being. But we 
think about what such a being would be like under the assumption that logical space lets it 
be omnipotent, omniscient, etc. Being omniscient etc. are not part of the concept. They follow 
from satisfying it given auxiliary assumptions about logical space. (122 comes close to this 
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perhaps worship-worthy—our sense of these latter usually being incho-
ate. If we found that Marcus Aurelius had been the greatest possible being, 
even an amorphous sense of “great enough” or “worship-worthy” would 
tell us that Aurelius wasn’t. Thus, we would conclude that there had been 
no God.7 This response leaves intact another thesis chapter 6 argues for, 
i.e., that just satisfying the concept the greatest possible being is not sufficient 
for being God.8 That does seem fatal to the particular PBT move chapter 6 
is directed against. But many other perfect being projects do not suppose 
the sufficiency claim.
Chapter 7 asks whether “God” means or abbreviates “greatest possible 
being” or “greatest conceivable being,” and whether either is a Kripkean 
reference-fixer. Speaks’s main move is that if it means or abbreviates 
either, then e.g.,
My five-year-old daughter believes that God exists
and
My five-year-old daughter believes that the greatest possible being exists
cannot differ in truth-value, but in fact, they do.9 Presumably Speaks 
thinks this because Daughter assents to “God exists” but not “the greatest 
possible being exists.” But while Daughter doesn’t use “the greatest possi-
ble being exists” to express her belief, that’s no guarantee that she doesn’t 
believe that the greatest possible being exists. I can’t express my beliefs in 
words I don’t understand, but sentences using those words nonetheless 
express propositions I believe. Suppose that
1. “God” abbreviates “the greatest possible being.”
Daughter has not learned (1). That doesn’t stop her from picking up a 
correct reference for “God” from others and knowing a lot of truths about 
God. (Someone could know truths about a country called “USA,” but 
not know what the letters abbreviate.) Given (1), “God exists” and “the 
greatest possible being exists” express the same proposition. Daughter 
doesn’t know that they do, and so does not agree that the greatest possi-
ble being exists. But this is only because she does not adequately under-
stand “God exists.” Now I am not suggesting that (1) is true. My point is 
that Daughter’s assents and dissents are not enough to establish that the 
thought.) In Aristotelian terminology, being the greatest possible is the divine essence, and 
omniscience etc. are (we think) proper accidents that go with that essence. In the Aurelius 
case, we find that satisfying our concept did not have entailments we thought it had. We 
conclude that nothing ever had God’s proper accidents. But there is a God, we think, only if 
something has both God’s essence and God’s proper accidents.
8Speaks pointed this out to me in correspondence.
9Speaks, The Greatest Possible Being, 141, 143.
10Speaks, The Greatest Possible Being, 142–146.
266 Faith and Philosophy
propositions above really do differ in truth-value, nor then that (1) is false. 
Speaks also offers harder cases: an adult orthodox theist who is skeptical 
about modal properties, an adult theist convinced by philosophical argu-
ment that there could not be a greatest possible being.10 But being adult, 
etc. are no guarantee of knowing (1).
The Second Stage
Suppose that there is a greatness condition satisfying which entails being 
a property of the greatest possible being.11 Suppose too that possible great-
ness really does have a maximum. Then all attributes that satisfy the con-
dition are compatible. If F passes this test, the greatest possible being is 
F. If G also passes, the greatest possible being is also G. So if F and G were 
incompatible, the greatest being would have incompatible attributes. So it 
would not be a greatest possible being. But we’ve supposed, in effect, that 
some possible being is the greatest possible being.
On these highly favorable assumptions, all attributes that pass are com-
patible. However, it does not follow that all attributes that we think pass 
are compatible. For our intuitions about greatness may be inconsistent. If 
they are, attributes that seem to us to pass could be incompatible. They 
might also seem so. If this happens, PBT needs to sort things out. Either 
the seeming to pass or the seeming incompatibility must give. For if nei-
ther gives, the greatest supposedly possible being is not a possible being. 
So, if this happens—as it does—PBT needs a second stage to deal with it. 
In Proslogion 5, Anselm seems initially to assume that just being better to 
have (i.e., satisfying a greatness condition) suffices for an attribute to be 
God’s. But he then shows that he knows that more needs saying. For the 
next chapters of the Proslogion set out all the compatibility issues he sees 
and try to handle them.
As our intuitions may not be or may not seem consistent, actual histor-
ical PBT often has a second stage. This checks the compatibility of items 
that seem to meet the greatness condition. If problems appear, the second 
stage winnows out at least one best set from these. Chapter 1–4’s picture of 
PBT does not include a second stage.12 It is idealized, rather than a perfect 
reflection of the real historical article. In effect, Speaks there assumes ideal-
ized perfect being thinkers whose greatness intuitions neither conflict nor 
seem to. This is okay for dialectical purposes, if the problems he raises for 
his idealized versions do apply to what perfect being thinkers have actu-
ally done (or tried to do). The less his idealizations are like the real histor-
ical article, though, the more doubt there is about this. I now suggest that 
11Speaks, The Greatest Possible Being, 11.
12Chapter 5 is about the possibility of conflicts. So while he does not treat dealing with 
them as a second stage of PBT, Speaks is certainly aware of the issue.
13Speaks, The Greatest Possible Being, 19.
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Anselm’s PBT is significantly unlike Speaks’s idealizations. If space per-
mitted, I could make similar points about, e.g., Duns Scotus and Leibniz.
Seeking a Greatness Condition
I start with greatness conditions. Speaks toys with greatest actual being 
theology to set up problems for greatest-possible and greatest-conceivable 
projects. Speaks’s first greatest-actual-being greatness condition is13
2. (x)(y)((Φx ∧ ¬Φy) → (x > y)).
If F meets (2), then whatever has F is greater than whatever lacks it. (2) 
won’t do. For if F has no instances, F’s case of (2) is true. So, if (2) is the 
right greatness condition, the greatest actual being has every attribute 
nothing has, including the ones nothing could have. Requiring in addition 
that (∃x)(Φx) doesn’t fix this, says Speaks. For then we can conclude that 
omnipotence satisfies the resulting condition only if we already think that 
something is omnipotent. But surely if we think anything is omnipotent, 
and believe that God exists, we think God is omnipotent. So, the result-
ing condition can’t give theists new information about whether God is 
omnipotent.14
(2) has a related problem. If there is a greatest actual being, to conclude 
that F satisfies (2), we’d have to premise inter alia that the greatest actual 
being was F. So, (2) can’t lead us to truths about the greatest actual being 
which we don’t already believe on some other basis. If we can’t use (2) to 
argue that the greatest actual being is F without premising that the great-
est actual being is F, (2) makes greatest actual being theology beg the ques-
tion, on my preferred account of question-begging. This problem carries 
over to any other extensional greatness condition for greatest actual being 
theology.
Our earlier (GC) was the analogue of (2) for greatest possible being the-
ology. It faces an analogue of the problem with (2). Just as we must premise 
that the greatest actual being is F to conclude that F satisfies (2), we must 
premise that the greatest possible being is F to conclude that F satisfies 
(GC).15 Any other greatness condition trading on properties’ extensions 
within or across possible worlds will share this problem. To conclude that 
an attribute satisfies the condition, we would have to premise that the 
greatest being has it. This is just what we want to use the condition to 
decide. Thus, to provide new information, PBT needs to start with some-
thing that does not concern extension across possible worlds. It could start 
14Speaks, The Greatest Possible Being, 20–21.
15I saw this independently. Speaks notes that Duns Scotus saw it long before (95–97). 
Speaks’s attitude toward Scotus’s argument is a bit puzzling. Speaks gives it, then offers a 
response he calls “correct as far as it goes” (97), then says he thinks Scotus’s argument sticks 
because we can’t have good reason to conclude that a candidate output of PBT is compatible 
with the divine nature (97). But Scotus’s problem concerns whether we can even be in the 
right position to arrive at a candidate output. It’s irrelevant to that whether any output we 
arrived at would be compatible with the divine nature. That issue only arises at a later stage 
of the “process.”
268 Faith and Philosophy
from something we learn by conceiving beings with and without F.  Or 
it could start from something intensional—something about properties’ 
content. The two approaches may overlap, for we might conceive beings 
with and without F as a way to clarify thoughts about properties’ content.
There is a reason specifically to go intensional. I state it in reference to 
(GC), but it carries over to any other extensional greatness condition. The 
following seems possible: every possible F is greater in worlds in which it 
is F than every possible not-F is in worlds in which it is not. So, F passes 
(GC). Yet this is not because they’re Fs. F-ness is neutral or negative. 
F-ness passes (GC) because necessarily, Fx ≡ Gx, and G is a great-maker. 
Let F = being the greatest possible being and G be having the attributes 
which earn its greatness. Being the greatest possible being is being greater 
than every other possible being. Being greater entails nothing about how 
great that is. It’s compatible with having zero or even negative overall 
greatness—as long as every other possible being has less. So just of itself, 
being the greatest possible is a neutral property. The great-maker is G, to 
which F is equivalent, if the maximum of possible greatness makes it into 
positive territory. Thus, being the greatest possible being is itself an exam-
ple of this problem.
Anselm does start with the intensional. Anselm’s first pass at PBT, in 
the Monologion, speaks of what is “better to be than not to be” simpliciter. 
This is how he explains the notion:
Though a just person who is not wise seems better than a wise person who 
is not just, it is not better simpliciter to be not-wise . . . whatever is not-wise, 
simply inasmuch as it is not-wise, is less than what is wise, for everything 
that is not-wise would be better were it wise.16
“Simply inasmuch as” signals an intensional claim, one that extension 
over worlds doesn’t capture. We might state it with “qua” or “in virtue 
of”; the thought seems to be that the wise are, in virtue of being wise, better 
than—something. The text gives two ideas about what. One is “whatever 
is not wise.” The other is it itself as not non-wise. The resulting claims are 
not equivalent, and while the second supports the first, it does not imply 
it. I suspect that Anselm believes both. There is a further tangle here. No 
begonia is wise. This is necessarily so. Further, being a begonia is (let’s say) 
an essential property. So, no individual which is a begonia can be wise. So, 
one might wonder whether indeed “everything that is not-wise would be 
better were it wise.” But if I’m right about begonias, the conditional
 Were the begonia wise, it would be better
has an impossible antecedent, and so is true. Anselm might accept it; he 
does say that a parcel of lead would be better if it were a parcel of gold.17 
The tangle lies a little further on. For even in the impossible circumstance 
16Monologion 15, I, 28. My translation.
17Monologion 15. Perhaps an alchemist stayed over at Bec one night and convinced him 
that being gold and being lead were not essential properties.
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we’re discussing, the plant would not be better solely in virtue of being 
wise. It would be better due both to wisdom and to the underlying changes 
that had made it capable of that. Only things already capable of wisdom 
can be better entirely in virtue of being wise.
What is clear, at any rate, is that for the Monologion, the condition which 
warrants asserting that the greatest being is wise is intensional. F meets 
it if Fs are in virtue of being Fs better than—whatever. This is true only 
if F-ness is better to have than any attribute whatever that is incompat-
ible with F-ness. If it is better to have, then what acquires it, in virtue of 
acquiring it, is better. Thus, Anselm supports his intensional claim about 
wisdom by pointing out that it “behaves” this way: whatever else is true 
of anything not wise, it would be better were it wise. The intensional fact 
implies this further, distinct fact.
Claims like “everything that is not-wise would be better were it wise” 
power a P2-style reductio. For recall P2’s “ontological argument”: that than 
which no greater can be conceived would be greater if it existed than if 
it did not. That’s because whatever does not exist would be greater if it 
existed. So, Monologion 15 gives us an intensional condition F’s meeting 
which lets F generate a P2-style reductio and so get ascribed to a perfect 
being. At least, the reductio is sound if being better in this one respect does 
not carry with it a greater cost in another. But if that were true, the attrib-
ute in question would not be (as Monologion 15 puts it) in every respect bet-
ter to have than to lack. Thus, Monologion 15’s intensional condition plays 
the role of Speaks’s “greatness condition.”
The Proslogion is clear on the relation between its characteristic reductio 
and the Monologion’s “simpliciter better to be.” For in Proslogion 5, Anselm 
claims that P2-style reductio delivers “whatever it is better to be than not to 
be.” That is, he claims that any attribute it is simpliciter better to have, gets 
ascribed to the greatest being that way. The Proslogion’s argument form 
just applies the “everything that is not__would be better were it __” the 
Monologion inferred from its intensional starting point.
Thus, Anselm’s own “greatness condition” may be that
3. It is simpliciter better to be F than not to be F.
To judge whether something satisfies (3), we think about what it is to be 
F. That’s why this condition is intensional. We may get a grip on this by com-
paring things that have and lack F. But we compare these just in respect of 
being F. They’re ciphers, used only to get F-ness before our minds. We do 
not consider whether any actual being has F or whether any particular pos-
sible being does, though we might want to assure ourselves that it is possible 
for something to be F. Just how we compare such beings, further, may be 
implicit in the Proslogion’s reiterated “than which no greater can be thought.” 
We conceive beings with and without F. Then we compare them. We make a 
judgment about which is best. Then, perhaps, we somehow move from the 
conceivable to the possible—we do not after all want to conclude that the 
greatest being is something impossible—and run a P2-style reductio.
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(3) gets around problems for (GC) and other extensional greatness con-
ditions. We needn’t know whether a greatest being has F to apply (3) to 
F. For we can grasp what it is to be wise, powerful, etc., without supposing 
anything about extensions. Again, unexemplifiable attributes don’t meet 
(3). For it is greater to be than not to be a round square only if being a round 
square is greater than anything incompatible with it. Round-squareness is 
incompatible with any exemplifiable attribute. So, it satisfies (3) only if 
being a round square is better than having any exemplifiable attribute. 
This is not so, not least because being a round square entails not existing. 
Another problem Speaks raises is that some greatness conditions ascribe 
to the greatest being such attributes as having a functioning heart.18 Such 
attributes flunk (3). Only animals have functioning hearts.19 So having a 
functioning heart is better than any state precluding it only if being an ani-
mal is better than being anything precluding being an animal. It is not, at 
least if we accept a priori methods of finding what’s possible. For these tell 
us that across logical space there are better things to be, e.g., an archangel. 
By generalization, (3) will not select belonging to a surpassable or limited 
kind or improving attributes tailored to such a kind.
Speaks’s idealizations do not fit Anselm’s intensional starting point, or 
the “start from conceivability, move to possibility” strategy that might fig-
ure in the Proslogion.20 If space permitted, I could (I think) show that Duns 
Scotus and Leibniz use intensional greatness conditions. It’s not clear that 
problems raised for an extensional-condition project really find purchase 
against Anselm and the rest.
Against Great-Possible Extensional Theology
One of Speaks’s idealized forms of PBT reasons about a greatest possible 
being, uses modal operators ranging over possible worlds, and uses an 
extensional greatness condition, e.g., (GC). This great-possible extensional 
theology, or GPET, is the subject of Speaks’s chapter 3.21 If the last section 
is correct, GPET isn’t what Anselm and other pre-Leibniz perfect being 
thinkers had in mind or tried to execute. If it isn’t, it is not correct to ide-
alize what they were doing as GPET, and problems for GPET don’t afflict 
18E.g., Speaks, The Greatest Possible Being, 26.
19Or machines wired to use a heart. This variation gets the same result, in the end.
20This is not the same thing as chapter  4’s “epistemic” PBT—PBT employing “great-
est conceivable being.” The latter moves from being the greatest conceivable being and a 
greatness condition phrased in terms of what is conceivable to a conclusion that God has an 
attribute.
21Try not to think of “chia pet” when you read this. Go ahead. Try.
22Of course, other problems may, including problems Speaks raises for other idealized 





the historic projects.22 I now argue that taking Anselm and the others as 
doing GPET is in one respect uncharitable. If I’m right, we ought in addi-
tion to resist taking them that way.
As Anselm and the other pre-Leibnizian friends of PBT saw it, all intrin-
sic attributes of a greatest possible being were essential. Its only “acci-
dents,” they thought, were extrinsic and relational.23 Further, to Anselm 
et al., such accidents do not add greatness.24 Thus for them, perfect being 
theology’s only possible outputs are divine essential attributes. I  now 
argue that this claim about outputs is pretty near the mark. I then show 
what it implies for GPET.
I start with the idea of a universe-relative accident: making universe u, 
knowing all about universe u, etc. These can’t be outputs of perfect being 
theology unless there’s a best possible universe. For suppose that it’s good 
to make (know about, etc.) only universe u. Either it is or it is not better 
to make (know about, etc.) only a universe or set of universes better than 
u. Suppose that it is not. Then no particular universe-relative accident is 
“simply better to have” than any other. Making (knowing about, etc.) only 
u earns, say, 2 greatness points. So do making u1, making both u and u1, 
etc. So none of these is better to have than any attribute incompatible with 
it. Thus, PBT selects no such accident.
Suppose now that it is better to make (know about, etc.) better. 
Presumably this is because the universe(s) involved is (are) better. If it is, 
then every such attribute is bettered unless there is a best possible uni-
verse or set of universes. There is not. Every such attribute is bettered. 
So, none is better to have than any attribute incompatible with it. So PBT 
selects none of them. Universe-relative accidents can’t be outputs of PBT.
I now go a step further. Many divine accidents are relational. Knowing 
this or that contingent truth is knowing about some world in the class of 
possible worlds in which that truth is true. It involves a relation to a world. 
Again, having made this or that is having made some universe in the class 
of universes in which this or that exists. And so on. If such accidents sup-
ply greatness, presumably the quantity goes up with the value of what is 
known, done, actualized, etc. This has no maximum. So, in this class, for 
every divine accident another would be better. Still other divine accidents 
are parasitic on such relational accidents, e.g., God’s knowing that He 
knows this or that contingent truth. For these the no-best problem recurs.
If I look for divine accidents that might be purely intrinsic, the strong-
est candidates, to me, are preferences. Actually, God preferred to make a 
universe containing me. This preference is contingent. He might have pre-
ferred one without me instead. There is always a better contingent pref-
erence to be had, as long as there are ever-better possible things to prefer. 
Perhaps preferring conscious to non-conscious things can’t be improved 
on. Perhaps this is the ideal attitude to have in this comparison. But, plau-
sibly, this preference would not be contingent, for this reason among oth-
ers. If a preference is unsurpassable, then a perfect being could not lack it 
unless it could fail to be perfect—and no perfect being worth its salt could. 
272 Faith and Philosophy
If a preference is surpassable, it has or it lacks an unsurpassable alterna-
tive. If it has one, a perfect being would have that alternative necessarily. 
If it lacks one, there is always a better contingent preference to have. This 
reasoning generalizes. If it is on target, no contingent divine attribute can 
be an output of PBT. For they’re all surpassable. So only divine essential 
attributes can be outputs of PBT.
I now ask whether GPET can select a divine essence. GPET surveys 
beings in possible, not conceivable, worlds. So, it can select a divine essence 
only if something in some possible world has the essence. But to select a 
divine essence, PBT must compare candidate divine essences for great-
ness. Consider, e.g., a divine essence N that includes necessary existence 
and necessary moral perfection, and a divine essence C which includes 
necessary existence and contingent moral perfection. PBT asks whether 
having N or C would be greater. In GPET, we can answer only by compar-
ing something that has N in some possible world with something that has 
C in some possible world. But if both N and C are possibly exemplified, 
both are actually instanced, courtesy of modal ontological arguments. So, 
monotheists will insist that we can’t compare N and C by looking at possi-
ble worlds. We can only compare them in conceivable worlds.
PBT looking at possible worlds cannot compare candidate perfect-be-
ing essences involving necessary existence by means of an extensional 
greatness condition. For these, we need greatest conceivable, not greatest 
possible being reasoning, or else something purely intensional. But then, if 
a perfect being would exist necessarily, as most believe, GPET cannot pick 
a divine essence. Nor (I have argued) can it pick divine accidents. It cannot 
have any outputs at all.
An idealization that won’t even let the PBT machine work is extremely 
uncharitable. So our presumption should be that GPET does not correctly 
represent historical PBT. We should think otherwise only if evidence 
forces us to. Speaks argues that other idealized forms of PBT may collapse 
into GPET under pressure. I don’t think they must. But due to space limits, 
I can’t take the discussion further here. I say only that the “collapse” point 
should worry projects modelled on historic PBT only if these other ideali-
zations are decent representations of historic projects.
Some historical PBT starts intensionally. Some may start by comparing 
conceived beings and hope to get to possibility claims one can feed into 
a P2-style reductio whose quantifiers range over possible worlds.25 Speaks 
discusses neither kind of project. Nor do his idealizations represent 
them well. (His other main idealization applies an extensional greatness 
25This is what I had in mind in God and Necessity, though it takes putting a couple of texts 
together to see it.
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condition to beings in conceivable rather than possible worlds. This isn’t 
clearly the same thing as comparing conceived beings.) So, there might be 
a way to end-run around the problems Speaks raises for his idealizations. 
That is worth thinking about. But so are the problems Speaks raises, and 
whether they show that PBT needs the end-run. I understand PBT better 
for having worked through those problems. You will too.
Rutgers University
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